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Even More Complex After All These Years:
What the Complexity of the “How?” Question of Tailoring
Claim Scope Has to Say About the “Who?” Question
Kevin Emerson Collins*
In On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, published in 1990 in the Columbia Law
Review,1 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson made several important contributions to patent
scholarship. Complex Economics added a strong, knowledgeable voice to the then-nascent
argument that the dynamic costs attributable to the reach of today’s patents into tomorrow’s
technology is a critical variable in the calculus required to optimize patent protection.2 It
mapped out an industry-by-industry approach to the optimal tailoring of claim scope, pointing
to factual differences between the innovation processes that drive technological progress in different industries and demonstrating how these factual differences could lead to a need for legal
differences in permissible patent breadth.3 It backed up its argument with historical evidence
of the different effects that broad patents have had on technological progress in different industries.4,WLGHQWLÀHGHQDEOHPHQWDQGWKHGRFWULQHRIHTXLYDOHQWV '2( DVWKHNH\GRFWULQHV
that created the discretion through which examiners and courts could adjust claim scope.5
Given the importance and breadth of its contributions, Complex Economics has unsurprisingly
served as a platform for a rich and diverse literature in the twenty years since it was published.
*Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law in Saint Louis. I thank the participants in the Patent
Scope Revisited: Merges & Nelson’s “On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,” 20 Years After conference
held at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law on September 23–24, 2010. I thank Mark Janis, in particular, for organizing and hosting the conference.
1. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV  
2. Compare W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND ECONOMIC WELFARE   IRFXVLQJRQWKHHIIHFWRIWKH
GXUDWLRQRIDSDWHQWRQEHKDYLRUWKDWJHQHUDWHVWKHWHFKQRORJLFDOSURJUHVVWKDWLVGLVFORVHGLQWKHSDWHQW with
0HUJHV 1HOVRQVXSUDQRWHDWQ FLWLQJWKHQDVFHQWFRQWHPSRUDU\OLWHUDWXUHRQWKHÀQHWXQLQJRI
SDWHQWVFRSHWRDIIHFWSRVWSDWHQWLQJSURJUHVV 0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQ·VDUJXPHQWWKDWSDWHQWVFRSHVKRXOGEHQDUrower at the margin in certain industries to promote competition among many players for post-patent progress
ZDVDOVRLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHLWVHUYHGDVDFRXQWHUZHLJKWWR(GPXQG.LWFK·VDUJXPHQW WRWKHH[WHQWWKDW.LWFK
PDGHDQRUPDWLYHDUJXPHQW WKDWSDWHQWVVKRXOGEHEURDGWRDOORZSDWHQWHHVWRFRRUGLQDWHSRVWSDWHQWSURJUHVV
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON 
3. Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 880–84.
4. Id. at 884–908.
5. IdDW²
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In this brief comment, I attempt neither an even-handed assessment of Complex Economics on its merits nor a comprehensive review of its diverse intellectual progeny. I put on
blinders and focus on a narrow issue. I identify one facet of the complexity inherent in the
tailoring of patent scope that Complex Economics did not discuss, and I point out the wrinkle
that it creates for both Merges and Nelson’s project and a line of contemporary scholarship
that builds on Complex EconomicsQDPHO\'DQ%XUN·VDQG0DUN/HPOH\·VGLVFXVVLRQRI
“policy levers.”6SHFLÀFDOO\,IRFXVRQWKHRYHUORRNHGFRPSOH[LW\LQWKH´+RZ"µTXHVWLRQ
of tailoring claim scope—Given the redundancy in the doctrinal mechanisms that could be
used to tailor claim scope, how should the tailoring of claim scope be accomplished in any
JLYHQFDVH"³LQRUGHUWRUDLVHWRGDWHXQH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQVDERXWWKH´:KR"µTXHVWLRQ³
*LYHQWKHSUHVHQFHRI&RQJUHVVWKH372DQGWKHFRXUWVDVLQVWLWXWLRQDODFWRUVLQWKHSDWHQW
DUHQDZKRVKRXOGKDYHWKHDXWKRULW\WRVHWWKHUXOHVIRUWDLORULQJFODLPVFRSH"
:KHQYLHZHGZLWKWKHEHQHÀWRIKLQGVLJKWWKHIRFXVLQComplex Economics on enablePHQWDQGWKH'2(DVWKHVROHPHDQVWKURXJKZKLFKVFRSHWDLORULQJGLVFUHWLRQFDQEHH[HUcised is too narrow. In large part, the narrowness follows from the fact that the enablement/
'2(IUDPHZRUNKDVEHHQRXWGDWHGGXHWRMXGLFLDOGHYHORSPHQWVWKDWZRXOGKDYHEHHQGLIÀFXOWWRIRUHVHHLQ6LQFHPDQ\PRUHVFRSHWDLORULQJGRFWULQHVKDYHFUDVKHGWKH
party. The Supreme Court established that claim construction is an issue for judges, ushering in a decade-long dispute over claim construction methodology in the Federal Circuit that
vividly demonstrates claim scope’s dependence on claim construction.8 The Federal Circuit
discovered enablement’s long-lost twin in the application of the written description requirement to original claims.9 Most recently, the Supreme Court highlighted the potential impact
of the section 101 doctrine of patent eligibility on claim scope.10
A good start on the needed work of cataloging the array of doctrines that courts can today
XVHWRWDLORUFODLPVFRSHKDVDOUHDG\EHHQGRQHLQWKH´SROLF\OHYHUVµSURMHFWRI'DQ%XUN
and Mark Lemley.11%XUNDQG/HPOH\WDNHVHOHFWWKHPHVSUHVHQWHGLQComplex Economics,
generalize them, and enrich them with an analysis of institutional competence. They argue
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMELY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT  
0DUNPDQY:HVWYLHZ,QVWUXPHQWV,QF86  
8. See generally3KLOOLSVY$:+&RUS)G )HG&LU  en banc  GLVFXVVLQJWKHGLVSXWH 
9. See generally$ULDG3KDUPV,QFY(OL/LOO\ &R)G )HG&LU  en banc  XSKROGLQJWKH
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWWRRULJLQDOFODLPV 
10. Bilski v. Kappos6&W  ,QWHUHVWLQJO\DWWKHVDPHWLPHWKDWWKHGRFWULQHVWKURXJKZKLFK
courts can tailor claim scope have been on the rise, the doctrine of equivalents—in both its rights-expanding
and “reverse,” rights-contracting forms—seems to have atrophied as it is today rarely dispositive of the extent
RIDSDWHQWHH·VULJKWV2QWKHGHFOLQHRIWKHGRFWULQHRIHTXLYDOHQWVVHH-RKQ5$OOLVRQ 0DUN$/HPOH\
The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents6WDQ/5HY  ,QWKHWZHQW\\HDUVVLQFH
the publication of Complex Economics, the Federal Circuit has only once held that a triable issue of material
IDFWH[LVWHGXQGHUWKHUHYHUVHGRFWULQHRIHTXLYDOHQWV6FULSSV&OLQLF 5HV)RXQGY*HQHQWHFK,QF
)G  
11. BURK & LEMLEY, supraQRWH
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WKDWSDWHQWSURWHFWLRQFDQEHWZHDNHGRQPDQ\PDUJLQV LQFOXGLQJEXWQRWOLPLWHGWRFODLP
VFRSH WKDWWKHV\VWHPDWLFWZHDNLQJRISDWHQWSURWHFWLRQRQDQLQGXVWU\E\LQGXVWU\EDVLV
can bring patent protection closer to its optimum,12DQGWKDWWKHMXGLFLDU\ UDWKHUWKDQWKH
372RU&RQJUHVV LVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQWKDWVKRXOGEHHQWUXVWHGZLWKWKHWDVNRIWDLORULQJSDWHQW
protection through the adjustment of doctrinal policy levers.13 In the course of their much
ODUJHUSURMHFW%XUNDQG/HPOH\IRUPXODWHDOLVWRIGRFWULQHVWKDWFDQWRGD\EHFRQFHSWXDOized as policy levers for tailoring claim scope.14
While the increase in the number of potential scope-tailoring doctrines or policy levers
RYHUWKHODVWWZRGHFDGHVKDVEHHQZHOOGRFXPHQWHGRQHRILWVUDPLÀFDWLRQVKDVQRW7R
GDWHWKHVXSHUDEXQGDQFHRISROLF\OHYHUVIRUWDLORULQJSDWHQWVFRSHKDVEHHQXVHG DOEHLW
LPSOLFLWO\ WRDUJXHWKDWWKDWWKHWDVNRIFUHDWLQJLQGXVWU\VSHFLÀFSDWHQWSURWHFWLRQKDVEHFRPHHDVLHU,QDVHQVHWKLVLVWUXH,WLVRIWHQHDVLHUWRÀ[DOHDN\IDXFHWZKHQ\RXKDYH
PRUHWRROVLQWKHWRRONLW+RZHYHUÀ[LQJDOHDN\IDXFHWDQGÀ[LQJLQHIÀFLHQFLHVLQSDWHQW
ODZDUHGLIIHUHQWLQDZD\WKDWLVLPSRUWDQWWRUHPHPEHUWKHJRDORIDSOXPEHULQÀ[LQJD
VLQNLVJHQHUDOO\WRÀ[thisVLQNZKHUHDVWKHJRDORIWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWLQÀ[LQJLQHIÀFLHQFLHVLQSDWHQWODZLVQRWVLPSO\WRÀ[WKHULJKWVRIthis plaintiff and this defendant but also,
in the course of doing so, to establish clear precedent that can be followed in similar cases in
the future. It is the need for clarity in the choice of which redundant, scope-tailoring policy
OHYHUWRXVHWKDWPDNHVWKHHQWHUSULVHRIWDLORULQJFODLPVFRSHRQDQLQGXVWU\VSHFLÀFEDVLV
well, more complex than has been acknowledged.15 The redundancy among policy levers
JLYHVULVHWRD´+RZ"µTXHVWLRQRQWKHOHYHORIV\VWHPGHVLJQ2IWKHPDQ\SRVVLEOHSROLF\
levers that could be adjusted to affect claim scope, how should the tailoring of claim scope
EHDFKLHYHGDVDGRFWULQDOPDWWHU":KLFKRIWKHPDQ\SRVVLEOHOHYHUVWKDWFRXOGEHSXOOHG
VKRXOGEHLQDQ\JLYHQFDVH"
This system-design question was already a theoretical problem in the narrow enablement/
'2(IUDPHZRUNRIComplex Economics. Why use a claim validity doctrine, like enablement, to narrow a patentee’s rights in one situation and an infringement doctrine, like the
%XUNDQG/HPOH\DOVRDGRSWDPRUHGLYHUVHVHWRIQRUPDWLYHMXVWLÀFDWLRQVIRULGHQWLI\LQJWKHRSWLPXPDQG
thus expanding or contracting claim scope, than Merges and Nelson did.
7KHUHDUHVLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKH´GLVFUHWLRQµRIMXGJHVDQGH[DPLQHUVWKDW0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQ
posited, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 839–42, 852, and the authority of courts to use policy levers
XSRQZKLFK%XUNDQG/HPOH\UHO\+RZHYHUWKHVHGLIIHUHQFHVDUHHOLGHGKHUH
%XUNDQG/HPOH\QRWHWKDWFODLPVFRSHFDQEHDIIHFWHGE\WKHGHÀQLWLRQRIWKH3+26,7$LQWKHGLVFORVXUH
doctrines, BURK & LEMLEY, supraQRWHDW²WKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQGRFWULQHid. at
118–22, the “abstract ideas” strand of section 101 doctrine, id. at 122–24, many of the distinct sub-doctrines
ZLWKLQ WKH GRFWULQH RI HTXLYDOHQWV LQFOXGLQJ UHDVRQDEOH LQWHUFKDQJHDELOLW\ id. at 124–25, the element-byelement analysis, idDW²DQGWKHSLRQHHULQJSDWHQWGRFWULQHidDW² DQGWKHUHYHUVHGRFWULQHRI
equivalents, idDW+RZHYHU%XUNDQG/HPOH\GRQRWFRQVLGHUWKHLPSDFWRIUHVWULFWLRQVRQIXQFWLRQDO
claiming. See, e.g., infraQRWHVDQGDFFRPSDQ\LQJWH[W
15. Technically, the redundancy creates a system-design problem whether or not courts tailor claim scope in an
LQGXVWU\VSHFLÀFPDQQHU,QGXVWU\VSHFLÀFWDLORULQJRQO\FRPSRXQGVWKHSUREOHP
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UHYHUVH'2(WRQDUURZDSDWHQWHH·VULJKWVLQDQRWKHU"+RZHYHUWKHV\VWHPGHVLJQTXHVtion has become more pressing as the redundancy among the policy levers has grown. Some
new redundancies have already been recognized by the Federal Circuit. For example, the
Federal Circuit has openly pondered why it is appropriate to use written description to invalidate overbroad claims in one case and claim construction to narrow claim scope in another.2WKHUUHGXQGDQFLHVDUH\HWWREHLGHQWLÀHGDQGLQWKHIXWXUHDUHOLNHO\WROHDGWR
further confusion. For example, consider the juxtaposition of two recent cases in which the
)HGHUDO&LUFXLWLQYDOLGDWHGEURDGIXQFWLRQDOO\GHÀQHGFODLPVIRUODFNRIVXIÀFLHQWVWUXFWXUDO
embodiments in the written description. In computer software cases, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly held that purely functional claim language triggers the section 112, paragraph
UXOHVRIPHDQVSOXVIXQFWLRQFODLPLQJDQGWKDWWKHIDLOXUHWRGLVFORVHDVWUXFWXUHWKDWLV
FDSDEOHRISHUIRUPLQJWKHFODLPHGIXQFWLRQPDNHVWKHFODLPLQGHÀQLWHXQGHUVHFWLRQ
paragraph 2. In a biotechnology case, the Federal Circuit addressed a claim that it acknowledged was drafted in purely functional language, but it failed to even consider the relevance
RIVHFWLRQSDUDJUDSKWRWKHLVVXHDWKDQG18 Rather, it concluded that the functional
claim language, coupled with a lack of any structure that was capable of performing the
claimed function in the written description, rendered the claim invalid under the written description doctrine of section 112, paragraph 1.19
Why these two radically different doctrinal routes were taken in two cases that both presented the same policy problem—functional claim language without any structural embodiPHQWVEHLQJGLVFORVHGLQWKHZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQ³LVGLIÀFXOWWRXQGHUVWDQGIURPDUDWLRQDO
system-design perspective.20 )URPDSUDJPDWLFSHUVSHFWLYHWKHGLIIHUHQFHFDQEHH[SODLQHG

,QVRPHLQVWDQFHVWKHFKRLFHPLJKWQRWDIIHFWWKHULJKWVRIWKHSDUWLHVLQDSDWHQWLQIULQJHPHQWFDVH DOthough using claim construction to narrow the claim would leave the claim valid and enforceable against other
SRWHQWLDO LQIULQJHUV   Compare &KLURQ &RUS Y *HQHQWHFK ,QF  )G  ² )HG &LU  
KROGLQJWKDWDEURDGFODLPHQFRPSDVVHVDIWHUDULVLQJWHFKQRORJ\DQGWKDWLWLVLQYDOLGIRUODFNRIVXIÀFLHQW
ZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQ ZLWKidDW² %U\VRQ-FRQFXUULQJ  DUJXLQJWKDWFODLPVVKRXOGEHFRQVWUXHGQDUURZO\VRDVQRWWRHQFRPSDVVDIWHUDULVLQJWHFKQRORJ\ ,QRWKHULQVWDQFHVKRZHYHURSWLQJIRUFODLPFRQVWUXFtion rather than written description as the relevant policy lever might lead to different outcomes. LizardTech,
,QFY(DUWK5HVRXUFH0DSSLQJ,QF)G²   5DGHU-GLVVHQWLQJIURPWKHGHQLDORI
a petition for rehearing en banc  DGGUHVVLQJWKH´SX]]OLQJµMX[WDSRVLWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWVXEVWDQWLYHRXWFRPHVLQ
DFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQFDVHDQGDZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQFDVH 
 %ODFNERDUG ,QF Y 'HVLUH/HDUQ ,QF  )G  )HG &LU  $ULVWRFUDW7HFKV Y ,QW·O *DPH
7HFK)G )HG&LU 
$ULDG3KDUPV,QFY(OL/LOO\ &R)G )HG&LU  en banc 
19. Id.
20. Two possible answers are unsatisfying. First, unlike the software claim, the biotechnology claim did not
XVHWKHWHUP´PHDQVIRUµLQWKHFODLPODQJXDJHWULJJHULQJDSUHVXPSWLRQWKDWVHFWLRQSDUDJUDSKGLGQRW
JRYHUQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHFODLP3HUVRQDOL]HG0HGLD&RPPF·QVY,7&)G² )HG&LU
 +RZHYHUWKLVSUHVXPSWLRQLVVXSSRVHGWREHRYHUFRPHLIWKHFODLPHPSOR\VSXUHO\IXQFWLRQDOODQJXDJH
WRGHÀQHDOLPLWDWLRQidDQGWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWQRWHGWKDWWKHELRWHFKQRORJ\FODLPGHÀQHGWKHLQYHQWLRQZLWK
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as a path-dependent result of how the parties to the litigation framed the issues at hand. More
on this below.21 ,QWKHEHVWRISRVVLEOHZRUOGVLQZKLFKWKHUHGXQGDQWGRFWULQHVDOOHQIRUFH
identical substantive restrictions on claim scope, this redundancy simply detracts from the
coherency of patent doctrine. In the more likely of possible worlds, however, this redundancy leads to similar cases receiving dissimilar treatment because each doctrine requires a
different quantum of structural disclosure to justify a claim of a particular scope.22
To this point, the lesson to be drawn in this comment from the existence of the systemdesign question might simply be that, if the Federal Circuit takes on the challenge of using
PRUHSROLF\OHYHUVRQDQLQGXVWU\VSHFLÀFEDVLVLWKDVPRUHRQLWVSODWHWKDQHLWKHU0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQRQWKHRQHKDQGDQG%XUNDQG/HPOH\RQWKHRWKHUKDYHDFNQRZOHGJHG
+RZHYHUWKHV\VWHPGHVLJQTXHVWLRQUDLVHVDQRWKHULVVXH³DQLVVXHDERXWWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO
competence of the Federal Circuit to be the primary driver of the patent-tailoring process.
%XUNDQG/HPOH\H[SUHVVO\PDNHWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWKDVWKHFRPSHWHQFH
to tailor patent protection on an industry-by-industry basis because “[t]he litigation process
ZLOOSURYLGHMXGJHVZLWKWKHLQIRUPDWLRQWKH\QHHGWRGHFLGHFDVHVµLQDQLQGXVWU\VSHFLÀF
manner.23 In brief, the argument is that the adversarial system will make parties with narrow
interests in upholding their patents into effective purveyors of information about the economics of patent protection in a given industry. If I’m the owner of a biotechnology patent, I
have incentives to provide the court with the data supporting the urgent need for broader bioWHFKQRORJ\SDWHQWVLQJHQHUDOLI,·PWKHDOOHJHGLQIULQJHURIDELRWHFKQRORJ\SDWHQW,KDYH
incentives to provide the court with data demonstrating the costs of broader biotechnology
SDWHQWVLQJHQHUDO+RZHYHULWLVKLJKO\TXHVWLRQDEOHZKHWKHUFRXUWVFDQUHO\RQWKHSDUWLHV
to provide the information needed to establish in a clear, systematic way which of the redundant policy levers should be used. No party will ever argue that, as a matter of public policy,
it would be best to have narrower literal claim scope and then to expand protection under the
GRFWULQHRIHTXLYDOHQWV DVRSSRVHGWRHLWKHUEURDGOLWHUDOFODLPVFRSHDQGDUREXVWUHYHUVH
doctrine of equivalents or just-right literal claim scope with little effect from the doctrine of

purely functional language. Ariad Pharms, 598 F.3d at 1354–55. Second, the biotechnology case arguably preVHQWHGVRPHWKLQJHTXLYDOHQWWRD´VLQJOHPHDQVµFODLPWRZKLFKWKHVHFWLRQSDUDJUDSKUXOHVGRQRWDSSO\
86&   VSHFLI\LQJDUXOHRIFODLPFRQVWUXFWLRQIRU´FRPELQDWLRQµFODLPV +RZHYHUWKH
rule for “single means” claims is that they are categorically invalid, regardless of the substantive nature of the
disclosure, In re+\DWW)G )HG&LU VRWKHELRWHFKQRORJ\FODLPFRXOGKDYHEHHQLQYDOLGDWHG
on that ground. For a more in-depth discussion of the redundancy of the written description doctrine and the
restrictions on the use of functional claim language that led to congressional adoption of section 112, paragraph
VHHJHQHUDOO\.HYLQ(PHUVRQ&ROOLQVTailoring Patent Scope with Disclosure Standards and/or FunctionalClaim Rules ZRUNLQSURJUHVV 
21. See infraQRWHVDQGDFFRPSDQ\LQJWH[W
22. See, e.g., supraQRWH
%URK & LEMLEY, supraQRWHDW0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQDOVRLPSOLFLWO\DUJXHWKDWERWKFRXUWVDQGH[DPiners can gain access to the needed information insofar as they argue in favor of judges and examiners exercising discretion in the shaping of claim scope on an industry-by-industry basis.
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HTXLYDOHQWVLQHLWKHUGLUHFWLRQ ,IWKHSDUW\ZDQWVWREURDGHQWKHVFRSHRIWKHSDWHQWEHIRUH
WKHFRXUWLWVVHOILQWHUHVWZLOOQHYHUXUJHLWWRPDNHWKHÀUVWKDOIRIWKHDUJXPHQW QDUURZ
OLWHUDOFODLPV ,IWKHSDUW\ZDQWVWRQDUURZWKHVFRSHRIWKHSDWHQWLWVVHOILQWHUHVWZLOOQHYHU
DOORZLWWRPDNHWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHDUJXPHQW H[SDQVLYHSURWHFWLRQXQGHUWKHGRFWULQHRI
HTXLYDOHQWV 6LPLODUO\QRSDWHQWRZQHUZLOOHYHUDUJXHWKDWZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQVKRXOGEH
abandoned but enablement should be interpreted in a robust way so as to invalidate many
patents, including the patent at issue in the litigation. The self interest of litigants in Article
III courts will likely not prove to be an effective vehicle for advancing the public interest
in a coherent patent regime for tailoring claim scope. The system-design question requires
GLVFXVVLRQVRIWKHFRVWVDQGEHQHÀWVRIDOWHUQDWLYHPHDQVRIUHDFKLQJDVXEVWDQWLYHHQGDQG
parties are usually only interested in providing information when the information is probative of whether or not a substantive end should be reached.
7KHLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRPSHWHQFHRIWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWWRGHFLGHWKHVHFRQGRUGHU´+RZ"µ
question is yet further undermined because cases on appeal to the Federal Circuit rarely
present a smorgasbord of the redundant policy levers from which the Federal Circuit could
choose. Cases are usually tracked or framed as, for example, either claim construction or
written description cases by the time they reach the Federal Circuit. The framing may exist
from the beginning: it may result from the parties’ strategic choices in the pleadings.242U
the framing may be an artifact of the manner in which the district court chooses to resolve the
case. In theory, the Federal Circuit could attempt to overcome the doctrinal frame in which
a case is presented by performing its own analysis, using oral argument to raise issues that
ZHUHQRWEULHIHGDQGUHTXHVWLQJDGGLWLRQDOEULHÀQJIURPWKHSDUWLHV25+RZHYHUWKH)HGHUDO
Circuit rarely demonstrates any interest in deviating from the parties’ framing of the issues.
If the parties or the district courts possess the power to set the frame—if they can present to
the Federal Circuit a single doctrinal policy lever that the court must opt either to pull or not
to pull—then the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence on claim scope is likely to resemble
a game of “whack-a-mole”UDWKHUWKDQDUDWLRQDOSURFHVVRILQGXVWU\VSHFLÀFSDWHQWWDLORULQJ'LVWLQFWRSLQLRQVDUHOLNHO\WRSRXQGDZD\RQGLVWLQFWGRFWULQHVRQHDIWHUWKHRWKHUDQG
in an uncoordinated fashion.
)RUH[DPSOHLQWKHÀUVWFDVHLQZKLFKZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQZDVDSSOLHGWRRULJLQDOFODLPVWKHDOOHJHGLQfringer argued that the claims at issue were invalid under the written description doctrine, but they did not raise
HQDEOHPHQW8QLYRI&DOLIRUQLDY(OL/LOO\ &R)G )HG&LU 
$PLFXVEULHIVPLJKWSURYHXVHIXOWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKHDXWKRUVDUHQRWSUR[LHVIRUWKHSDUWLHV·LQWHUHVWV OLNH
WUDGHDVVRFLDWLRQVRIWHQDUH 
7KH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·VKHDY\GHSHQGHQFHRQWKHSDUWLHV·IUDPLQJRIWKHLVVXHVFDQEHFOHDUO\VHHQLQWKH
Federal Circuit opinions that track the arguments in the parties’ briefs in minute detail, even when the issues
presented are pure issues of law like statutory construction. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
)G² )HG&LU  en banc  DOORZLQJWKHSDUWLHVWRIUDPHZKDWLVDWVWDNHLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVHFWLRQSDUDJUDSK 
.HYLQ(PHUVRQ&ROOLQVAn Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT/-available at http://www.patentlyo.
FRPÀOHVFROOLQVDULDGSGI
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,QVXPWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIWKHV\VWHPGHVLJQ´+RZ"µTXHVWLRQRIWDLORULQJFODLPVFRSHLV
an issue that neither Complex Economics nor its intellectual progeny has noted. This quesWLRQLQWXUQUDLVHVD´:KR"µTXHVWLRQ(YHQLIWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWKDVVXIÀFLHQWLQVWLWXWLRQDO
FRPSHWHQFHWRGHWHUPLQHLQGXVWU\VSHFLÀFUXOHVIRUWKHVXEVWDQWLYHVFRSHRISDWHQWULJKWVLW
may not be an institution that is well positioned to establish clear rules that determine which
of the many redundant policy levers that could be used to tailor patent scope should be used
in any given case.
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